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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Washington legislature enacted a number of
laws designed to protect the community against sex offenders
and to assist the victims of sex crimes.' By far the most con-
troversial of these laws is a sexual psychopath law2 that is
unique in American history. Sexual psychopath laws authorize
indeterminate commitment for treatment and control of sex
offenders believed to suffer from a mental disease or disorder
and thought to be dangerous. Although most states no longer
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. (1965), J.D. (1968), Yale
University. The Author wishes to acknowledge the insightful comments, criticisms,
and suggestions of David Boerner, Robert Boruchowitz, John Mitchell, Christopher
Rideout, Jenifer Shaw, David Wexler, and the invaluable research and editorial
assistance of Beth Fujimoto and Katey Miller.
1. The legislature passed a number of important laws relating to sex offenders.
These provisions were enacted as part of the Community Protection Act, 1990 Wash.
Laws ch. 3. Some of the key provisions are as follows: First, penalties for most sex
crimes were increased by an average of 50%. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, §§ 701-702
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.310 to -.320 (Supp. 1990-91)). Second, the period
of postrelease supervision for certain sex offenders was extended. Id. §§ 301(3), 304(4)
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.40.020(3), .210(4) (Supp. 1990-91)). Third,
mandatory treatment for juvenile sex offenders was established. I& § 302(5) (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(5) (Supp. 1990-91)). Fourth, outpatient treatment for
juveniles was made available as a sentencing option. Id. § 302(5)(b)(ii) (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.160(5)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1990-91)). Fifth, convicted sex offenders
were required to register with the police. Id §§ 401-409 (codified at scattered sections
of WASH. REV. CODE).
The legislature also enacted a number of programs to assist victims of sex crimes.
For example, the Community Protection Act established a grant program for the
provision of community-based treatment services for sex crimes victims. Id. §§ 1201-
1210 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.280.010 to -.902 (Supp. 1990-91)). Finally, the
Act established an office for a crime victims' advocate. See id. § 1202. Although the
governor vetoed this latter part of the bill, he promulgated an executive order
establishing the office. See "Governor's Explanation of Partial Veto" following 1990
Wash. Laws ch. 3.
2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
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utilize these laws, a majority of states, including Washington,3
have used them in the past.4
The Washington law, however, is different from prior sex-
ual psychopath laws in two fundamental respects. First, a per-
son subject to commitment must serve his full prison term
before he can be committed under this law. Thus, commitment
is not in lieu of conviction and punishment; it is in addition to
punishment.5
Second, the law does not require any allegation or proof of
recent criminal wrongdoing, dangerous behavior, deteriorating
mental state, or even inappropriate conduct before the state
may seek possible lifetime confinement.' The prosecutor need
only convince a judge or jury that the individual is a "sexually
violent predator."7 To accomplish this task, the government
must show simply that the individual is a "person who has
been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in predatory
acts of sexual violence."'
In sum, a single conviction for a qualifying sex crime at
any time in the past, together with a mental health profes-
3. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws
ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).
4. See generally SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 739-40 (3d ed. 1985).
5. Under the Washington law, petitions for commitment may be sought for those
who have served or are serving prison terms, those who have been found incompetent
to stand trial, or those who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91).
6. Only the District of Columbia permits commitment under its sexual psychopath
law without a previous filing of a criminal charge. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3504(a) (1989).
Prosecutors rarely invoke commitment under this law against unwilling defendants.
Commitment is occasionally used with agreement of both the prosecutor and
defendant in connection with a pending criminal charge and the law requires a guilty
plea in such cases. Prosecutors virtually never use the law to commit someone who is
living in the community and is not charged with a sex offense. Telephone interview
with David L. Norman, Staff Attorney, Public Defender Service, Mental Health
Division, St. Elizabeths Hosptial, Washington, D.C. (June 30, 1992).
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
8. Id. § 71.09.020(1). For a more thorough description of proceedings under the
statute, see Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 115-19 (1990). As discussed below, by not requiring recent
evidence of dangerous behavior, the law increases the risk that experts will
inaccurately predict that individuals are likely to commit crimes unless confined. The
law also makes it virtually impossible for anyone who has committed a single
qualifying sex crime to avoid commitment by obeying the law.
[Vol. 15:655
1992] Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law 657
sional's purported diagnosis and prediction of "likely" reof-
fense at any time in the future, is legally sufficient9 to
incarcerate someone for the rest of his or her life in a psychiat-
ric prison.10
This Article will demonstrate that the Washington legisla-
9. Both the Washington State Attorney General's Office and the King County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office have adopted filing standards for deciding whether to
seek commitment of any indiviudal as a sexually violent predator under the
Washington law. Office of the Attorney General, Sexually Violent Predator Filing
Standards, Final Draft (Dec. 18, 1990) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law
Review) [hereinafter Attorney General Standards]; Office of the Prosecuting Attorny,
King County, Filing Standards, Washington Section 20 (on file with the University of
Puget Sound Law Review) [hereinafter King County Standards]. Although the filing
standards vary in minor details, they are substantially the same. The sections on filing
considersations provide that normally, petitions are to be filed only when each of the
enumerated circumstances have been satisfied. Several of these circumstances raise
interesting questions.
Section IIIC of the Attorney General Standards specifies that a petition should be
filed only if
[t]he offender has a provable pattern of prior predatory acts; i.e. acts directed
toward either (a) strangers or (b) individuals with whom a relationship has
been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
(Offender's declaration(s), if any, of intent to commit predatory acts in the
future shall be considered in analyzing the pattern).
Attorney General Standards, supra at 5.
Because a "pattern" usually consists of two or more crimes, it appears that a peti-
tion will normally not be filed against an individual convicted of only a single crime.
Section IIIE provides "[n]ormally, a petition may not be filed if the offender has
been released from custody for a substantial period of time, during which he has not
engaged in any sex offenses or other activity indicating a continuation of the offender's
predatory behavior." Attorney General Standards, supra at 5. This requirement
seems to preclude filings against offenders living lawfully in the community for a "sub-
stantial period of time" unless recent evidence of dangerousness is available. Interest-
ingly, the King County Prosecutor filed a petition against Vance Cunningham, who
had been released from prison, living uneventfully in the community for four and one-
half months. See infra notes 95-96 and accompany text.
Both of these provisions seem to significantly constrict the reach of the statute.
While one might applaud some prosecuting authorities for narrowing the reach of the
law and for requiring probative evidence of dangerousness, such discretionary restraint
demonstrates the actual breadth of the statute. It appears that even prosecutors recog-
nize the law's reach is hopelessly expansive.
Section HID further provides that a petition may be filed when "[a] qualified
mental health professional has determined that the offender (a) currently suffers from
the requisite mental abnormality or personality disorder and (b) because of that
mental condition the offender is likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence."
Attorney General Standards, supra at 5. Unless this requirement is read carefully and
in context, it might imply that such evaluation is based upon a clinical evaluation of
the offender and his current psychological condition. Nothing could be further from
the truth. In most cases, the mental health professional simply conducts a records
review. This often involves nothing more than a review of an offender's official record
of convictions. In any event, it is almost never based upon a clinical examination of
the offender.
10. The Special Commitment Center is housed in the Monroe Reformatory in
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ture deliberately chose to abuse the medical model of involun-
tary commitment for treatment in order to achieve lifetime
preventive detention. In so doing, the legislature violated fun-
damental constitutional principles that underlie our system of
social care and control and safeguard individual liberty.
To understand why Washington's sexual predator commit-
ment law cannot be justified as a traditional sexual psychopath
statute, this Article will first examine the history of sexual
psychopath laws. Next, the Article will document the evolu-
tion in criminal justice ideologies that has resulted in the vir-
tual disappearance of sexual psychopath laws from the
American criminal justice system. This Article will then ana-
lyze how the process of law revision was animated by selective
storytelling. The law is poetic; it works through narrative."
The process of law revision begins in a story and ends in a
story; such stories provide communities with a shared sense of
what has happened and a common vehicle for interpreting
events. 2 This Article will argue that the narrative process
spawning this statute told only one kind of story, while exclud-
ing other instructive stories that would have deepened our con-
textual understanding of the complex situation. The tales told
soon acquired the power of myth.
Next, this Article will examine the predator commitment
law in some detail. We will see that the legislature had few
viable options available to achieve its primary purpose: keep-
ing convicted sex offenders that were considered likely recidi-
vists in custody beyond their lawful terms of imprisonment.
The legislature ultimately chose to use the medical model of
Monroe, Washington. It originally consisted of 36 beds that were once used to house
the most psychiatrically disturbed prisoners in the Washington state prison system.
The author was one of the first lawyers to visit this center. From all outward
appearances, it appeared to be a prison. The superintendent informed us that the
guards were employed by the Department of Social and Health Services rather than
the Department of Corrections. Evidently, government authorities believe that the
formal employment status of the guards is important in characterizing the facility as a
treatment facility rather than a prison.
As of this date, no permanent member of the staff, other than the superintendent
who serves only in an administrative capacity and does not participate in any
treatment programs, has any professional education, training, or experience in treating
sex offenders. The staff is, in effect, learning "on the job." Treatment sessions
evidently consist of approximately four hours a week in group sessions.
11. JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF THE LAW 168 (1985).
12. Id.
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involuntary treatment to accomplish its purpose of indetermi-
nate preventive detention.
Finally, this Article will demonstrate that this law revision
process deliberately excluded balanced and reflective participa-
tion, responded only to the political passion and paradigm of
the moment, and failed to build on objective expertise and
knowledge. Such a process will produce laws that probably do
more harm than good while wasting scarce resources.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAWS
To understand why the Washington law is a deliberate
misuse of the medical model of involuntary treatment for
social control purposes, we need only examine the history of
sexual psychopath laws in America. This history will show
that these once popular laws have been rejected by almost
every state, including Washington, because they were not
based on sound medical knowledge, they conflicted with chang-
ing public values, and they were both ineffective and counter-
productive. To compound matters, the new Washington law is
an even more extreme version of sexual psychopath laws
already abandoned by almost every state.
A. The Early History: The Rehabilitative Ideal and the
Therapeutic State
Traditional sexual psychopath statutes authorize the invol-
untary commitment of individuals charged with or convicted of
sex offenses and found to be mentally disordered and danger-
ous;1 3 such individuals are committed to psychiatric facilities
for control and treatment. 14 Minnesota was among the first of
the states to enact a sexual psychopath law.'" Its 1937 law
13. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 740.
14. Id.
15. See infra note 16. Prior to the Minnesota law, Illinois enacted a sexual
psychopath statute in 1938. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 302 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre, Jr. eds., 1961)
[hereinafter AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION]. In 1937, Michigan had enacted a statute
applicable to sexual psychopaths; however, the state supreme court invalidated this
statute because it exposed defendants to double jeopardy and failed to provide a jury
trial. Id. See also People v. Frontczak, 281 N.W. 534, 537 (Mich. 1938). Subsequently,
in 1942, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a similar civil commitment statute. See
People v. Chapman, 4 N.W.2d 18, 28 (Mich. 1942).
Following the lead of Illinois and Michigan, the states of California,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin soon enacted sexual psychopath
statutes. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 15, at 303.
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authorized the government to place a sex offender in a psychi-
atric institution for treatment rather than sending him or her
to prison for punishment.
16
By the late 1960's, well over half the states had enacted
similar laws that provided indeterminate treatment for
selected sex offenders.17 These laws were generally divided
into two major categories: (1) preconviction statutes that per-
mitted the initiation of psychopathy proceedings after charging
but before conviction of a sex crime, and (2) postconviction
statutes that required conviction of a sex offense before psy-
chopathy proceedings could be initiated.'" Typically, an indi-
vidual charged with or convicted of a sex offense could be
found to be a sexual psychopath in a judicial proceeding; the
person would then be hospitalized for control and treatment in
a mental institution or treated in the community in lieu of
imprisonment for punishment. 9 These laws have generally
been upheld as a legitimate state exercise both of its police
16. The United States Supreme Court upheld the law against constitutional
challenge in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 (1940). The
Minnesota law required the state to prove
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or
impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgement,
or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any
such conditions, as to render such a person irresponsible for his conduct with
respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
In Pearson, the Supreme Court accepted the construction placed on this section by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota court stated that the statute should
"include those persons who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,
have evinced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and... are likely
to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire." Id.
In addition, the Minnesota law provided that, except as otherwise provided, the
laws relating to "insane persons, or those alleged to be insane [i.e. civil commitment
laws], shall apply with like force to persons having, or alleged to have, a psychopathic
personality." Id. at 272. Thus, the Minnesota law required proof of a mental disorder
that rendered an individual irresponsible for his sexual conduct and generally applied
its civil commitment statute to sex offenders. The Minnesota scheme is thus properly
characterized as involuntary civil commitment of the mentally disordered rather than
as preventive detention.
17. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 739.
18. Id. at 740-41.
19. Id. at 345-46. A few states enacted special sentencing statutes that authorized
courts to impose indeterminate prison terms on individuals convicted of certain sex
crimes and considered dangerous. These statutes were enacted with the intent that
treatment would be provided to these prisoners. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39-19-1 to -10 (West 1963).
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power to protect the public from future harm and of its parens
patriae authority to treat those in need of treatment.
In 1971, Brakel and Rock aptly summarized the rationale
of this "modern" legislation: "The statutes are premised upon
the assumption that the relatively new science of psychiatry is
able to identify, isolate, and treat" sexual psychopaths.20 The
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards point out that:
[this sort of] special dispositional legislation rest[s] on six
assumptions: (1) there is a specific mental disability called
sexual psychopathy . . . ; (2) persons suffering from such a
disability are more likely to commit serious crimes, espe-
cially dangerous sex offenses, than normal criminals; (3)
such persons are easily identified by mental health profes-
sionals; (4) the dangerousness of these offenders can be pre-
dicted by mental health professionals; (5) treatment is
available for the condition; and (6) large numbers of persons
afflicted with the designated disabilities can be cured.21
These statutes reflected the buoyant therapeutic optimism of
that period.
As we shall soon see, rehabilitation of offenders emerged
as the dominant ideology of 1960's and 1970's. Much criminal
behavior was seen as caused by illness. Sexual deviancy, in
particular, was considered specially susceptible to mental
health treatment. Experts could identify and cure those sex
offenders suffering from psychological pathology, permitting
their release into society as productive and safe members.
Both society and the individual would benefit by this benign
application of medical expertise. The interest of the commu-
nity in safety and the interest of the "patient" in cure could
both be served simultaneously.22
B. The Later History: Responsibility and the Punitive State
By 1990, however, only a handful of states had sexual psy-
chopath laws on the books.23 A vast majority of states, includ-
20. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 341.
21. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-8.1 at
457-8 (1989) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
22. For an interesting historical analysis of this blending of cure and control in
American penal history, see generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
23. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-1.01 to -12 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp.
1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3503 to -3511 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Some states provided
for indeterminate sentencing to a psychiatric facility rather than commitment in lieu
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ing Washington 4 and California,25 had repealed these laws
either in their entirety or prospectively. Brakel explains why
almost every state no longer resorts to involuntary commit-
ment of sex offenders as an alternative to punishment:
Growing awareness that there is no specific group of individ-
uals who can be labeled sexual psychopaths by acceptable
medical standards and that there are no proven treatments
for such offenders has led such professional groups as the
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the President's
Commission on Mental Health, and, most recently, the
American Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards to urge that these laws be
repealed.26
In sum, most experts and policy-makers had concluded that
sex offenders were not mentally ill and that involuntary inde-
terminate treatment was ineffective in changing their criminal
behavior. Coercive rehabilitation simply did not work.
Not surprisingly, most thoughtful law revision took this
new knowledge into account. The Canadian Royal Commis-
sion on the Criminal Law Relating to Sexual Psychopaths con-
cluded that sex offenders should be treated as criminals.2 The
California legislature repealed its Mentally Disordered Sex
Offender legislation in 1981, declaring: "In repealing the men-
tally disordered sex offender commitment, the Legislature rec-
ognizes and declares that the commission of sex offenses is not
of conviction and punishment. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216
(West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
[S]ince 1976, 13 states have repealed their [sexual psychopath] laws and
another 12 have greatly modified them, the primary modification being to
make treatment voluntary to the prisoners. In all, as of 1984, sexual
psychopath laws exist in only 16 states and the District of Columbia. Of these
jurisdictions, only 6 actually enforce the laws in more than isolated cases.
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 740. "[In addition], today only five jurisdictions (sic)
still permit indefinite confinement, and of these only one [Massachusetts] uses its law
with any frequency." Id. at 741. The jurisdictions that currently allow indefinite com-
mitment are as follows: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-23-101 to -103 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3501 to -3511 (1989 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 105-1.01 to -12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A
(Law Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09 to -.11 (West 1975 & Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -5 (Michie 1990).
24. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws
ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).
25. See 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928, § 4 at 3485.
26. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 743.
27. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
RELATING TO CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS (1958).
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itself the product of mental disease."2
Thus, the clear trend today is to punish sex offenders as
responsible moral agents and to provide treatment to those
who want it while they serve their prison terms. Washington
adopted this strategy in 1984 when it abolished prospectively
its sexual psychopath law' and provided treatment for qualify-
ing sex offenders on a voluntary basis at the Twin Rivers
Center.30 Like most states, Washington concluded that invol-
untary treatment of sex offenders in lieu of punishment simply
was not effective.
C. The Evolving Story of Sex Offenders: From
Rehabilitation to Responsibility
This shift away from using the therapeutic model of com-
mitment to treat sex offenders to the criminal justice model of
punishing them can thus be seen as a story unfolding. When
sexual psychopath laws were popular, the law told the optimis-
tic story of a mentally ill sex offender who, if treated, could be
rehabilitated and released safely into the community.
But the meaning of the story changed over time in light of
new experiences. Policymakers were told a different sex
offender story, and the significance of the story changed. As
new empirical evidence emerged, the story told by sex offender
legislation became less optimistic and increasingly fearful;
according to these new stories, sex offenders choose their
behavior and should be punished as responsible moral agents
for their bad acts. The story changed from one about sickness
to one about evil.
III. CHANGING IDEOLOGIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Demise of the Rehabilitative Ideal
The wholesale repeal of sex offender commitment laws in
the United States was consistent with ideological shifts in the
American criminal justice system. Foremost among these
shifts was the loss of confidence in what Frances Allen called
28. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928, § 4 at 3485.
29. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws
ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(7)(b)(c) (Supp. 1990-91). The legislature also
permitted a small group of first-time sex offenders to receive treatment in the
community rather than serve a prison sentence. Id. § 9.94A.120(7)(a).
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the "rehabilitative ideal."'" The practice of punishment that
emerged under this rehabilitative ideal emphasized treatment
of the offender to change his underlying personality and to
make him safe to be returned to society. Indeterminate sen-
tencing was crucial to this schema. Experts needed time to
assess and treat. Helping the individual criminal also helped
society. Parole boards would not release prisoners if they were
determined to still be dangerous. Under the rehabilitative
model, both compassion for the offender and the convenience
of society could be served at the same time.32
But the rehabilitative ideal came under scathing attacks
from both the political left and right. Liberals and neocon-
servatives alike argued that society knew very little about the
causes and cures for crime.33 They also argued that experts
could not accurately predict dangerousness. Increasingly, both
the policy-makers and the public lost confidence in the ability
of experts to change individual criminals for the better or to
select which offenders were too dangerous to be released.'
Nationally, the victims' rights movement played a signifi-
cant role in the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal. These
groups objected to the mischaracterization of criminals as
"patients" who needed treatment. Not only did a therapeutic
31. Allen described the assumptions of the rehabilitative ideal as follows:
It is assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes.
These causes can be identified as part of the physical universe, and it is the
obligation of the scientist to discover and to describe them with all possible
exactitude. Knowledge of antecedents of human behavior makes possible an
approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally, and of primary
significance for the purposes at hand, it is assumed that measures employed to
treat the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic function, that such
measures should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the
convicted person in the interest of his own happiness, health, and satisfactions
and in the interest of social defense.
Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 226, 226 (1959).
32. See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 43-81. For a full discussion of how the original
progressive era ethos of punishment has evolved in America since the early 1900's, see
JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) [hereinafter LA FOND
& DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM].
33. For a liberal critique of rehabilitation, see THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 40-47 (1st ed. 1971) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE]. For a
neoconservative critique, see ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS:
CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 184-91 (1975).
34. For a thorough review of this change in ideology, see LA FOND & DURHAM,
BACK TO THE ASYLUM, supra note 32.
[Vol. 15:655
1992] Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law 665
ideology obscure the serious physical and psychological harm
done to victims of violent crime, it also communicated the
wrong message: offenders were not at fault; rather, they
merely had broken personalities that needed repair."
B. The Reemergence of Responsibility and Retribution
As a consequence of attacks on the rehabilitative model,
the retributive theory of punishment, which punishes an indi-
vidual for what he did rather than who he is or might become,
has emerged as the dominant theory of criminal justice.3" This
canon became known popularly as the "just deserts" model of
punishment. Offenders are now considered moral agents who
choose to commit crime and, consequently, are responsible for
their actions. Punishment is inflicted as a response to past
behavior and is justified as of the moment it is imposed. It is
not justified by contingent future consequences which are vir-
tually unknown and unknowable.
To implement the just deserts ideology, a number of
states, including Washington in 1984,38 adopted determinate
sentencing.39 Rather than sentencing criminals to indetermi-
nate prison terms that effectively conferred broad sentencing
discretion on judges and parole boards, many states enacted
determinate sentencing schemes that computed presumptive
sentences based on the crime committed and the offender's
past criminal record.40
C. Criticisms of Indeterminate Sentencing
Liberals criticized indeterminate sentencing because it
conferred too much unguided discretion on unaccountable
bureaucrats and because it inevitably generated unequal treat-
ment among offenders and usually led to excessive prison
terms.4' Neoconservatives also disliked indeterminate sentenc-
35. See generally id.
36. See VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 33, at 8-23 for a forceful exposition of this
ideology.
37. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
38. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A (Supp. 1990-91).
39. At least ten states have adopted some form of determinate sentencing:
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico,
North Carolina, and Washington. MICHAEL H. TONRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS 77 (1987).
40. See supra note 39.
41. See generally STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 33; ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1st ed. 1976). See also DAVID BOERNER,
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ing.4 In their view, rehabilitation implemented through inde-
terminate sentencing embodied a view of human action that
was normatively wrong and empirically false: namely, that
socioeconomic conditions and individual pathology prevent
humans from exercising free will. 3 Neoconservatives argued
that humans do have free will and that offenders deserve to be
punished for what they have willfully done. Determinate sen-
tencing would set the socially appropriate penalty one must
pay for deliberately breaking the law.
Ironically, critics on both the political left and right agreed
that indeterminate sentencing was a failure. Many on both
sides also agreed, for different reasons, that determinate sen-
tencing was the answer." Liberals and neoconservatives dis-
agreed, however, on the scale of punishments that should be
enacted in a determinate sentencing scheme. Liberals wanted
a deflated schedule of penalties based on the principle of parsi-
mony rather than prison terms of long duration.45 Neocon-
servatives, on the other hand, wanted longer prison terms that
emphasized both punishment for wrongs done and extended
incapacitation to protect the community.46
In 1984, the Washington legislature agreed that determi-
nate sentencing was preferable social policy and enacted a
determinate sentencing law.47  In general, Washington pro-
vided relatively light sentences for serious sex offenders, espe-
cially repeat offenders.4 Thus, liberal ideology prevailed in
setting the presumptive sentences for sex crimes.49
SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF
1981 (1985).
42. For a discussion of neoconservativism and its influence during the past decade,
see LA FOND & DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM, supra note 32.
43. For a more thorough discussion of the neoconservative reaction to the
criminology of the 1960's and 1970's, see id.
44. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 33 at 124-25; VON HIRSCH, supra note
41, at 98-106.
45. Charles E. Goodell, Preface to VON HIRSCH, supra note 41, at xviii-xix.
46. See VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 33, at 53-55.
47. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137 (codified at scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE
(law became effective in 1984). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.905 (1989).
48. For example, the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act set the presumptive penalty for
first degree rape at five years. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.310-.320 (Supp. 1990-91).
In 1988, the legislature increased the higher ranges for most sex offenses. GOVERNOR'S
TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES,
FINAL REPORT 11-6 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
49. A special committee appointed by the legislature to recommend prison terms
under Washington's 1984 determinate sentencing law very nearly recommended that
most prison terms for any offense should not exceed two years. Evidently, a majority
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D. Dismantling Sexual Psychopath Laws
As ideologies shifted, sexual psychopath laws came under
special attack. Increasingly, experts concluded that sex offend-
ers were not sick in any clinical sense.5' Rather, most sex
offenders committed crimes for the same reasons that other
offenders commit crimes; their motivation for deviant behavior
may derive from an expression of anger, a desire to control, or
self-gratification. 51 Many sex offenders are simply antisocial
individuals. Others are situational offenders; they will offend
only if they find themselves in a situation that is conducive to
committing a crime. Factors associated with these instances of
crime include financial, marital, or other stress combined with
an opportunistic setting.52 In short, it is impossible in most
cases to generalize a causal connection between any particular
psychological condition and the commission of sex crimes.5 3
Further, no clear evidence suggests that sex offenders as a
group are more likely to reoffend than other criminals. In a
study of all state prisoners released in 1983, researchers found
that rapists had lower recidivism rates, as measured by rear-
rest, than kidnappers, robbers, and persons who had commit-
ted assault.' Thus, sexual psychopath laws could not be
justified as a necessary response to offenders who are particu-
larly dangerous.
Serious doubt also existed about the efficacy of sex
offender treatment programs. Most attempts to measure treat-
ment efficacy have relied on detecting recidivism among
of this committee concluded that any time beyond two years was excessive and
therefore counterproductive. This prison term limit would not have applied to
dangerous violent offenders. Ultimately, the committee could not agree on this
recommendation. Telephone interview with Robert Boruchowitz, committee member
(April 27, 1992).
50. Of course, some sex offenders are also mentally ill. But the commission of sex
offenses does not establish mental illness. 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1487
(1983).
51. Id. at 1486.
52. Id. at 1489-90.
53. This generalization has some exceptions. Pedophiles or individuals whose
sexual desires are focused on children are considered by some experts to suffer from a
mental condition that in some sense may cause their deviant behavior. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(DSM-III-R) 284-85 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
54. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1983 at 5 (1989). Recidivism rates are extremely difficult to ascertain
because most measurements rely on formal contact with the criminal justice system or
on self-reporting. Measurement difficulties, of course, tend to be constant for all types
of criminal offenders.
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patients who had received treatment in various programs.
Comprehensive reviews of sex offender treatment programs,
both voluntary and involuntary, reported a wide range of treat-
ment effectiveness.55
The authors of the most comprehensive and current
review of treatment programs for sex offenders reviewed the
criminal and psychological literature on sex offender treat-
ment programs. They selected 42 studies involving almost 7000
men. Some of their findings are startling. For example, eight
of the nine studies of untreated offenders reflected relatively
low recidivism rates, all below 12%. In contrast, two thirds of
treated offender studies reflected recidivism rates higher than
12%.56 The authors concluded: (1) ". . . we can at least say
with confidence that there is no evidence that treatment effec-
tively reduces sex offense recidivism;" and (2) "Thus, we must
conclude that there is no data at present for assessing the rela-
tive effectiveness of treatment for different types of
offenders."5
7
A major legislative study on the sexual psychopath pro-
gram in Washington confirmed the skeptics' view that these
programs did not work.58 In 1985, the Washington State Legis-
lative Budget Committee audited Washington State's sex
offender treatment programs and found that, in spite of the
highly selected population participating in these programs at
Eastern and Western State Hospitals, the recidivism rate by
those offenders who actually completed the program was about
the same as those incarcerated without treatment.59 Stuart
Scheingold persuasively demonstrates that the most thorough
studies fail to establish that treatment of sex offenders is effec-
tive in reducing subsequent crimes committed by these
55. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL.
33-4 (1989).
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 25. For a more thorough discussion see John Q. La Fond and James L.
Reardon, Sex Offender Treatment Laws in the United States: Past, Present, and
Future, paper presented at the XVIIIth International Congress on Law and Mental
Health, Vancouver, B.C., Canada (June 23-27, 1992) (on file with the U. Puget Sound L.
Rev.).
58. See Sex Offender Programs at Western and Eastern State Hospitals, Dep't of
Social and Health Services, Report No. 85-16 (December 13, 1985) (reporting to the
Washington State Legislature).
59. Id. at 6, 49-58. Recidivism rates were reported only for those offenders who
successfully completed the program. If recidivism rates were reported for offenders
who were referred to the program but failed to complete treatment, the "success
rates" for the program would be substantially worse than for untreated offenders.
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patients.6 ° In short, involuntary treatment of sex offenders
was simply not effective in reducing future criminal behavior
by this group of offenders. Thus, the programs could not be
justified as producing effective treatment.
Some evidence also indicated that treatment programs per-
mitted serious sex offenders to serve less time in confinement
and, in many cases, to avoid punishment altogether.6 1 In addi-
tion, some critics concluded that many sex offenders were
manipulating these programs by using them to avoid prison
while not making any serious effort to change their behavior.
Critics argued that these laws made the community more dan-
gerous rather than less dangerous.
Persuaded by such strong empirical evidence, Washington,
like most states in America, abandoned the involuntary treat-
ment of sex offenders in lieu of punishment. Instead, treat-
ment was made available to eligible convicted sex offenders on
a voluntary basis while they served their prison terms. As of
April 16, 1992, approximately 196 convicted sex offenders were
receiving treatment at the Twin Rivers Treatment Center in
Monroe, Washington. 62 Approximately 195 sex offenders were
on a waiting list for treatment. 3
E. "Law and Order" as a Social Movement
Abandoning the medical model of involuntary commit-
ment for treatment of sex offenders was consistent with the
general cycle of "law and order" reform that has swept
America since about 1980. In Back to the Asylum: the Future
60. Stuart Scheingold et al., The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington
State's Sexual Predator Legislation, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809 (1992). But see
Daniel Coleman, Therapies Offer Hope for Sex Offenders, NEW YORK TIMEs, April 14,
1992, at JB5 (indicating new therapies such as cognitive restructuring and relapse
prevention may be effective for some sex offenders on a voluntary basis).
61. As the American Bar Association commented, "Some legislatures came to feel
that offenders were being released prematurely under such [sexual psychopath]
statutes, with consequent danger to public safety." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, 7-
8.1 at 459.
For example, the 1979 repeal of the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act, 1951 Wis. Laws ch.
542, was seen as a "law and order" measure based on perceptions that offenders might
be released "too soon." Marie Therese Ransley, Note, Repeal of the Wisconsin Sex
Crimes Act, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 941, 950-51.
62. Telephone interview with Barbara Schwartz, Director, Sex Offender
Treatment Program, Twin Rivers Treatment Center (April 20, 1992).
63. Id. Of these 195 offenders, 123 are on an active waiting list at Twin Rivers, 17
offenders are in other facilities and would be released within three years, and 55 other
sex offenders are scheduled for release within 37-60 months. Id.
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of Mental Health Law and Policy in the United States, my col-
league, Mary L. Durham, and I demonstrate that over the last
decade or so, the criminal law has severely minimized mental
disorder as an excusing condition for harmful behavior.' The
insanity defense and other defenses based on mental disorder
have been significantly narrowed or abolished. Conviction and
punishment of offenders, rather than commitment and treat-
ment, have become the hallmarks of the neoconservative era.
Repeal by most states of their sexual psychopath laws is
consistent with this changing ideology. Mental disorder and
treatment will not be tolerated when perceived by the public
as permitting the release of potentially dangerous individuals
into society to prey again on unsuspecting victims and as excus-
ing rather than punishing those individuals. On the other
hand, as the new Washington sexual predator law demon-
strates, society seems quite willing to adopt the medical model
of indeterminate treatment when it serves a social control
function rather than a therapeutic function.
In sum, changing ideologies have transformed the Ameri-
can criminal justice system, and sexual psychopath laws have
been virtually eliminated from society's crime control arsenal.
Early sexual psychopath laws provided involuntary treatment
rather than punishment. Today, sex offenders are being pun-
ished as responsible moral agents and are offered treatment in
prison only if they want it. The pendulum swing from the
rehabilitative ideal and indeterminate sentencing to a just
deserts system of determinate sentencing illustrates the pro-
cess of a story being retold. It also reflects how the perspective
of the lawmaker as narrator has shifted in response to the sto-
ries being told by neoconservatives and victims' rights groups.
These stories have new import: criminals, especially sex
offenders, are responsible moral agents who have earned pun-
ishment for their bad acts.
IV. LAW REVISION
Until the very end of the 1980's, no agitation existed in
Washington to change how sex offenders were processed under
the law. What generated a sudden urgency for law revision
concerning sex offenders, and why did the Washington legisla-
ture embrace the medical model of involuntary treatment that
64. LA FOND & DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM, supra note 32.
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it had so recently abandoned as ineffective and harmful to pub-
lic safety?
A. Rising Crime Rates and a Powerful Story
A dominant background catalyst in this new cycle of law
revision is likely the rather steady and sometimes sudden
surge in crime rates in America since about 1960. Crime
against persons and property began to increase significantly in
the early 1960's-the halcyon days of the rehabilitative ideal-
and increased at alarming rates in the 1970's. According to the
Uniform Crime Reports, the rate of violent crime increased
almost fifty percent between 1971 and 1980.5 Although crime
leveled off and even declined briefly during the early 1980's,
crime rates generally continued to increase during the greater
part of the 1980's.' Unquestionably, America has become a
more violent place in the second half of the twentieth century.
Not surprisingly, the public has become more fearful of crime
and criminals.67
But the rather steady increase in crime cannot explain the
sweeping legal changes dealing with sex offenders enacted by
the Washington State Legislature in 1990. Although the crime
rates surely created a favorable context for law and order revi-
sion, other precipitating causes also contributed to these legal
changes. Foremost among these is the story of "the little boy."
As recounted so powerfully by Professor David Boerner in his
contribution to this symposium,68 the sexual mutilation of a
seven-year-old boy by Earl Shriner two years after Shriner's
release from prison inflamed public passion.
The story of the little boy became the story of sex offend-
ers and sex crimes. This tragic tale and its effect on law revi-
sion provide compelling evidence of the power of narrative to
shape public imagination and to generate irresistible clamor
for law revision as symbolic reassurance to the community.
65. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S.: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1980).
66. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S.: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1988).
67. See RESEARCH & FORECASTS, INC., THE FIGGIE REPORT ON FEAR OF CRIME:
AMERICA AFRAID, Parts I, II, and II (Willoughby, Ohio: A-T-O, Inc. 1980).
68. See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).
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B. The Compelling Power of Narrative
Stories play an influential role in shaping the law. Indeed,
the process of law revision itself can be seen as the telling of
distinct stories.6 9
James Boyd White provides an enlightening insight into
the role narration plays in molding legal change. 70 The story is
the most basic way in which society organizes its collective
experiences and infuses meaning into them. Stories are always
incomplete, ever-evolving, and unstable. We retell a story
"over and over again ... claiming a meaning for it in light of
new events; or, more precisely, claiming slightly shifting mean-
ings as new experiences add new material."' 7' Events initially
considered unimportant later take on greater significance in
view of constantly unfolding experiences. Conversely, what
once seemed of totemic importance can quickly lapse into trivi-
ality.72 Society constantly adjusts its sense of import.73
The process of law revision is the act of telling stories, rec-
ognizing and building on multiple stories.74 That this process
provides for the retelling of multiple stories is not accidental
or even incidental; it is deliberate and structural. Legislative
hearings seek stories from the community. These tales may be
similar or divergent. After listening to narratives told by the
community, those empowered select an official story and then
translate it into a more formal fable: a law. This process is
both selective and reductive: "[N]o story can include every-
thing[;] .. . every story is a reduction, a fiction, made from a
certain point of view."75 Important characters and events will
necessarily be left out of the story. The license to include or
exclude is given over to the narrator who has a point of view.
The story will surely reflect the teller's perspective, including
bias and interest.
69. For additional discussion of the role of narratives in the process of law reform,
See J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name? A Rhetorical Reading of
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 781 (1992).
70. WHITE, supra note 11, at 168.
71. Id. at 170.
72. Id.
73. Id. For example, the changing criminal procedure ideologies adopted by the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts may be seen as a process of retelling evolving
stories: from telling a story of repressed, downtrodden minorities to telling a story of
an increasingly violent, crime-riddled society. See also supra notes 31-40 and
accompanying text.
74. Cf. WHITE, supra note 11, at 174.
75. Id. at 175.
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If law revision is a process of selective storytelling and the
official story fails to be as complete and contextualized as pos-
sible, then the resulting law may be unwise and unjust. The
recent law revision process in Washington, which spawned a
sexual psychopath law unique in American history, did not
attempt to tell a social narrative as completely and accurately
as possible. Rather the narrators of this story recounted it to
placate their audience. As a result, the whole story has not
been told.
C. The Task Force and Its Narrative
The major genesis of the Washington law revision was the
Governor's Task Force on Community Protection. This group
of twenty-four members, selected by Governor Booth Gardner,
was charged with reviewing Washington's law and policies to
see how they might be improved to better safeguard past and
prospective victims against sex offenders. Observers have
offered a variety of reasons why a task-force approach to law
revision was taken. These explanations range from ensuring
bipartisan support for any recommendations that might
emerge" to heading off more radical "law and order" propos-
als77 by taking law revision out of the traditional political and
legislative processes.
In any event, the Task Force was chosen as the storyteller
with authority to tell the officially sanctioned version. Thus,
the story ultimately told by the Task Force would, and did,
reflect the perspective, interest, and bias of its members.
Although valid and well-intentioned reasons for using the
76. Indeed, the measure drafted by the Task Force, Second Substitute Senate Bill
6259, passed unanimously on all readings in both houses of the legislature. See 1
WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE DIGEST AND HISTORY OF BILLS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES 51ST LEGISLATURE 541-42 (8th ed. 1990).
77. The call for castration of sex offenders gathered surprisingly strong support
among Washington legislators. Jim Simon, Castration: Would It Stop Offenders?
Experts Split, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at Al.
Support for castration of sex offenders came not only from extreme conservatives,
but also from mainstream legislators, including Senate majority Leader Jeannette
Hayner. Id. at Al. This support is somewhat surprising because no appellate court in
the United States has yet upheld surgical castration of sex offenders, even on a
voluntary basis. However, some courts have permitted "chemical castration" with the
drug Depo-Provera, which lowers the level of the male hormone testosterone. Unlike
surgical castration, this treatment is reversible. See, e.g., State v. Krieger, 471 N.W.2d
599 (Wis. App. 1991) (implicitly upholding use of Depo-Provera); Gauntlett v. Kelley,
849 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir. 1988) (making Depro-Provera treatment a condition of
probation.).
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task-force approach may exist, the Task Force posed serious
risk to the process of rational law revision for a number of
important reasons.
As discussed earlier,78 all narrators are inherently limited
storytellers. The Task Force was further hampered in telling
the story of sex crimes in Washington because of its basic
structure. The Task Force could not tell the complete story
because it could not hear the entire story. Let me explain.
First, the Task Force did not hear competing stories
because it was a closed group. It held a series of public hear-
ings; however, most of the stories told were ones of anger and
fear. The Task Force did not hear the stories of defense attor-
neys, sex offenders, or their families. The atmosphere of these
hearings was simply not supportive of those who would have
told cautionary stories. In addition, the criminal defense bar
was underrepresented on the Task Force. Of the twenty-four
members, only two members of the Task Force had any expe-
rience defending criminals, and none of them were currently
practising in the field.79 The defense bar was not formally rep-
resented. Conversely, victims' rights groups were generously
represented on the Task Force. 0 This apportionment process
seemingly impacted the group. One will not find a single dis-
senting comment throughout the Task Force Report. Appar-
ently, the political pressure to enact the commitment law was
so overwhelming that any opposition was futile.8
To add to the problems of perspective, bias, and silencing,
the Task Force was unduly weighted with experts who had a
vested interest in the answers to some of the most important
questions to be considered: Are sex offenders mentally disor-
dered? Are sex offenders especially dangerous? If so, can
mental health professionals accurately identify which ones are
especially dangerous? Is involuntary treatment effective in
reducing recidivism among sex offenders? 2 The answers to
78. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
79. Task Force member Robert Stalker was an attorney with Evergreen Legal
Services, the statewide agency that offers legal services to low-income persons.
Yvonne Huggins-McLean, another member, was a former public defender. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 1-6.
80. Task Force members included: Ida Ballasiotes, chairperson of Friends of
Diane and SAVUS (Stop All Violent Unnecessary Suffering); Helen Harlow, mother of
the little Tacoma boy; and Trish Tobis, president of Family and Friends of Missing
Persons and Violent Crime Victims. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 1-4 to 1-7.
81. Scheingold et al., supra note 60, at 816-17.
82. Task Force members included: Roland Maiuro, Director of the Harborview
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those questions were largely delegated to a small number of
Task Force members, some of whom run sex offender treat-
ment programs for victims of sex offenses and others who treat
sex offenders.8 3 Their programs are heavily funded by the leg-
islature. Conversely, a number of nationally recognized
experts in law and mental health who have written extensively
on civil commitment and the criminal responsibility of the
mentally disordered were not appointed to the Task Force nor
were they invited to evaluate its recommendations. In short,
the process lacked the breadth of disinterested knowledge,
expertise, and deliberation that can enhance the quality of law
revision.
The outpouring of community frustration and indignation
was, in retrospect, not surprising. As already noted, crime had
been steadily increasing for the better part of two decades.8 4
The public meetings provided an opportunity for citizens to
express their fear and frustration over the increasing crime
that has plagued society for the last two decades. This diffuse
public fear focused on a single outrage and its perpetrator.
The criminal record of the attacker, his repulsive personal
appearance, and the special vulnerability of his victim com-
bined with the graphic visualization of the mutilation contrib-
uted to the emotional impact of the story and the resulting
outpouring of rage and calls for revenge.
The story of "the little boy" became the empirical founda-
tion for the sexually violent predator law. This vivid account
of a sex offender-one who carefully planned his horrible
crime, provided graphic verbal and visual evidence of his vio-
lent intentions, and relentlessly stalked his vulnerable vic-
tims-was transformed into a paradigm of sex offender
behavior. The story thus provided the paradigm problem that
required a fail-safe solution. Together with several other noto-
Anger Management Program at Harborview Medical Center; Lucy Berliner, social
worker at Harborview Medical Center's Sexual Assault Center; and Robert Scherz,
Medical Director of the Sexual Assault Program at Mary Bridge Children's Center.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 1-5.
83. This bias seems to be reflected in other portions of the 1990 Community
Protection Act. The Act also established certification requirements for sex offender
treatment providers, circumventing the procedures for establishing the regulation of
health care provided in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 18.120 (Supp. 1990-91). See 1990 Wash.
Laws ch. 3, §§ 801-811 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 180.155 (Supp. 1990-91)).
84. See supra notes 65-66. As Stuart Scheingold notes, the rates for the crime of
rape have not increased as much as rates for homicide, robbery, and burglary.
Scheingold et al., supra note 60, at 812-13.
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rious cases,15 the story of the little boy convinced the public to
overestimate grossly the relative frequency of similar sex
offenses.'
The Task Force did nothing to disabuse the public of this
mythopoeia. It did not undertake any review of crime rates in
Washington state nor did it review and analyze sex crime rates
for the state. Thus, the public had no way of knowing
whether its anxiety about sex crimes was based on a significant
increase in such crimes in this state. In fact, as Scheingold has
shown, no empirical basis existed for concluding that sex
crimes were increasing in Washington state. 7
Rather, the Task Force proceeded on a political basis.
Because the public and the media said there was a problem,
there was a problem. It appears that the political imperative of
the moment dictated that academics, who tend to view social
problems from different, and perhaps more objective, perspec-
tives not be appointed to the Task Force. 8 This failure may
explain why the Task Force Report contains so much mislead-
ing and, in many cases, simply incorrect information about sex
offenders.8 9 Indeed, absolutely no discussion or analysis of
some essential and fundamental factual questions is to be
found in the Task Force Report.
Without an accurate grasp of sex crime rates, the extent of
victimization, recidivism rates for sex offenders, the effective-
ness of involuntary treatment, and other salient factors about
sex crimes, the Task Force lacked a sound empirical basis for
effective law revision. In turn, it was highly unlikely that the
proposed legislation, based on the Report, would be responsive
to actual problems in the real world. Perhaps as important,
there was less opportunity to temper the anger and emotion of
the moment with relevant expertise and sound social science
information.90 Inevitably, the Task Force succumbed to the
85. In September, 1988, Gene Raymond Kane, who had previously been
imprisoned for two different sexual assaults, killed Diane Ballasiotes in Seattle while
on work release from prison. Julie Emery, Settlement Expected in Ballasiotes Death
Suit, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 1990, at B5. Ida Ballasiotes, the mother of the victim,
subsequently served on the Governor's Task Force.
86. Scheingold et al., supra note 60, at 816-20.
87. Id. at 811.
88. Only Professor Boerner, a law professor at the University of Puget Sound
School of Law in Tacoma, Washington and a former prosecutor, held a full time
academic appointment.
89. See also Scheingold et al., supra note 60.
90. A few individuals subsequently expressed serious concern about the
[Vol. 15:655
1992] Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law 677
distorting power of narrative. In turn, it did not tell the whole
story, or even a complete story, of sex crimes in Washington.
D. The Distorting Power of Narrative
As demonstrated above, stories are compelling. Indeed,
storytelling is probably the most convincing mode of persua-
sion in our culture. Because of its captivating power, narrative
can have a particularly distorting effect on law revision.
Lawmakers use narrative when constructing the paradigm
case. Legislators conceptualize the problem to be solved as the
problem told in the story. Consequently, legislators often try
to pass laws that promise the public that this case will never
happen again. The predator commitment law is precisely this
type of misguided law revision. The law makes the promise
that the story of "the little boy" will never be told again.
The promise is illusory. A convicted sex offender will be
released from prison and then sadly but inevitably commit
another heinous sex crime. We cannot, of course, identify
accurately who that person will be. The commitment law
merely creates the illusion of effective crime prevention
because one cannot know if any person incarcerated under this
law would have otherwise committed a crime. These cases of
mistakes or inaccurate predictions of dangerousness, false-posi-
tives to social scientists, are simply locked away, out of sight
and out of mind.
A moving story can be generalized to represent most cases.
Thus, law revision usually makes sense if most cases are, in
fact, similar to the graphic story. However, if the graphic story
is atypical, law revisions may prove in practice to be disastrous
public policy. Put differently, an effective and wise law is one
that intelligently and fairly resolves most cases most of the
time. Most sex offenders, however, are not like Earl Shriner.
In his testimony before the Senate Law and Justice Commit-
tee, Professor Boerner said:
What we [on the Task Force] had in mind was the case like
Shriner where you had direct physical evidence of plans to
commit future crimes, diaries, notes, and those sorts of
things. I think absent that.., a psychiatric prediction plus
the crime years ago isn't going to be enough to satisfy a jury
constitutionality and wisdom of the commitment law in legislative hearings held to
consider the Task Force Report.
678 University of Puget Sound Law Review
under the standards we've provided.9
In fact, the government has not produced a single piece of
explicit evidence like that available in the Shriner case that
manifests an intent to commit sex crimes in any predator com-
mitment trial; yet, it has won every case so far relying almost
exclusively on a record of past crimes and a prediction of a
future crime.92 Juries are simply too willing to assume that
anyone who has committed a crime in the past may commit
one in the future. Even more importantly, juries are unwilling
to take responsibility for releasing someone who might commit
another crime. The burden of this decision is too heavy to ask
of citizens.
Of course, other stories could have been told but were not.
Earl Shriner's story is interesting in its own right. Shriner's
I.Q. ranged from a low of sixty-seven to sixty-nine based on the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test. This clearly places him in
the "Mildly Mentally Retarded" range. Evidence also indi-
cated that he suffered neurological brain damage. Newspaper
accounts and the trial record establish that Shriner was repeat-
edly abused sexually and mentally in his youth, but he never
received any meaningful treatment during his childhood.
Apparently, he could barely read and write. 3 Of course, these
personal characteristics and life history do not excuse what he
did. But in a humane society they would certainly evoke some
modicum of sympathy and compassion. The full story of Earl
Shriner was never told.
Likewise, the story of Vance Cunningham is another tale
that was never told but is also interesting. Cunningham had a
history of dyslexia, which remained undiagnosed until he
dropped out of grade school at age fifteen. Criticized for being
a slow learner in school, Cunningham's dyslexia contributed to
feelings of inadequacy and failure. While serving prison time
for two 1987 second degree rapes of prostitutes, Cunningham
91. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington
at Appendix D, In re Young (Wash. filed Feb. 4, 1991) (No. 57837-1) (containing
excerpts from pages six and seven of transcript compiled from a tape recording of
Professor David Boerner's testimony before the Senate Law and Justice Committee on
Jan. 11, 1990).
92. The state has dismissed one petition seeking commitment under the predator
commitment law before presenting its case to a jury. In re M., No. 91-2-24039-6 (King
County Super. Ct. filed October 28, 1991).
93. Letter from Dino G. Sepe, attorney for Earl Shriner (Mar. 10, 1992) (on file
with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
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sought treatment.94 He did not receive it, however; he was told
his sentence was not long enough to qualify him for treatment.
While in prison, Cunningham worked toward his GED and
used motivational and self-help materials. After voluntarily
working with a reading specialist who taught him how to learn,
his reading level improved from a third grade to a ninth grade
level. Cunningham also studied marine mechanics.
After his release, his family and friends noticed dramatic
changes in Cunningham. Initially, he stayed with family and
friends and worked with a trucking company while he looked
for better employment. He had increased his ability to read
and seemed more confident. Cunningham reduced his use of
alcohol. He rented an apartment and even obtained insurance
for the first time in his life. During this time, he complied
with all conditions of his release, including registering as a sex
offender. When he secured a job in his chosen field of marine
mechanics on a commercial fishing boat, he felt "extremely
proud."95 As Cunningham stated: "I was doing everything to
make myself the best citizen I thought I could be."'  Four and
one half months after his release, he was arrested without a
criminal charge and committed to the Special Commitment
Center at Monroe where he languishes to this day.
At Cunningham's trial, the state did not introduce any evi-
dence of dangerous or even inappropriate behavior while Cun-
ningham was in prison or since his release from prison. Yet,
he may spend the rest of his natural life sitting in a locked cell
at Monroe. This story, of course, is right out of Franz Kafka's
classic tale, The Trial.97 But apparently, no one anticipated or
told a story like Vance Cunningham's when the legislature
passed the sexually violent predator law.
When only one story is told, as occurred in the enactment
of the predator commitment law, no competing stories give
context and depth to the larger narrative. No one prods for
reflection and caution. No other stories stimulate reconsidera-
94. In 1980 Cunningham, then 15 years old, pleaded guilty to assault in the second
degree and was sentenced to 20 days of confinement. In 1984 at age 20 he pleaded
guilty to rape in the second degree and was sentenced to 31 months in the Department
of Corrections. In 1987 Cunningham was convicted of two counts of rape in the second
degree and was sentenced to 54 months on each count, to be served concurrently.
95. Report of Proceedings, State v. Cunningham (King County Super. Ct. filed
May 29, 1991) (No. 90-2-20568-1).
96. Id. at 102-103.
97. See Robert C. Boruchowitz, Sexual Predator Law: The Nightmare in the Halls
of Justice, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 827 (1992).
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tion and continue the search for understanding. Rather the
lone story, even though woefully incomplete, becomes the
truth.
E. The Confirming Conclusions of Cognitive Psychology
Strong evidence confirms that narrative distorts and even
impedes rational analysis. Studies by cognitive psychologists
have demonstrated that people will assign much greater
weight to information contained in vivid narratives or case his-
tories, even though the information is quite weak as evidence,
than they will assign to statistical information that is highly
probative. Experts believe that that this process of human
inference occurs because graphic information tends to be more
emotionally interesting, concrete, and image-provoking than
abstract data summaries. 98
The following experiment demonstrates how a single,
vivid, yet questionably informative case history can influence
social attitudes when pallid statistics of far greater evidential
value fail to persuade.
Subjects were given a description of a single welfare
case. The description (condensed from an article in The New
Yorker magazine) painted a vivid picture of social pathology.
The central figure was an obese, friendly, emotional, and
irresponsible Puerto Rican woman who had been on welfare
for many years. Middle-aged now, she had lived with a suc-
cession of "husbands," typically also unemployed, and had
borne children by each of them. Her home was a nightmare
of dirty and dilapidated plastic furniture bought on time at
outrageous prices, filthy kitchen appliances, and cockroaches
walking about in the daylight. Her children showed little
promise of rising above their origins. They attended school
off and on and had begun to run afoul of the law in their
early teens, with the older children now thoroughly
enmeshed in a life of heroin, numbers-running, and welfare.
In a second set of conditions, the article was omitted and
subjects were given statistics showing that the median stay
on welfare for all middle-aged welfare recipients was two
years and that only ten percent of recipients remained on
the welfare rolls for four years or longer. These statistics,
which actually are approximately correct, stood in sharp
contrast to the subjects' beliefs about welfare. (Control sub-
98. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980).
[Vol. 15:655
1992] Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law 681
jects believed that the average stay on welfare was about ten
years.) 99
Researchers conducting the study found that those sub-
jects who had been given a vivid description of this one partic-
ular welfare family expressed more unfavorable attitudes
toward welfare recipients than the control group who had not
heard the story of this family. Even more startling, however,
is that the surprising but pallid statistical information about
the average stay on welfare had no effect on changing the
same control group's attitudes and opinions about welfare
recipients in a favorable direction.
This experiment suggests that stories, although of margi-
nal evidential value, persuade nonetheless because more time
may be spent attending to stimulating information than to bor-
ing statistical information of equal or greater relevance. More-
over, the graphic concreteness of stories is more easily
remembered and retrieved than abstract information. Events
described in explicit terms also have enhanced emotional
impact because actors, actions, and context are more detailed
and specified. This clarity makes an event more imaginable
and provokes other memories or associations. Finally, vivid
information may remain active in people's thought processes
longer than more pedestrian data, thereby increasing memory
availability and prompting people to assume tacitly that what
has occupied their thoughts for so long must be important.
Researchers have thus concluded that people will irration-
ally cast aside probative information, which is dull, in favor of
interesting information which is of questionable normative sig-
nificance. Frequently, people will cling to erroneous impres-
sions even when confronted with strong evidence dispelling
those impressions.
It is no surprise, then, that the story of "the little boy"
drove law revision and that the Task Force and legislature did
not consider extremely relevant but "abstract" and "dull"
empirical data about sex crimes and sex offenders, which was
particularly useful to their objectives. But we should also not
be surprised if the commitment law proves over time to be
ineffective and counterproductive. After all, the law was
shaped by the distorting power of narrative.
99. Id. at 57.
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F Conclusion: The Process Abused
The history of sexual psychopath laws in the United States
demonstrates that all of the laws' premises had been categori-
cally rejected. Mental disorder did not cause individuals to
commit sex crimes. Involuntary treatment was not effective in
reducing recidivism rates for sex offenders. Thus, the medical
model of indeterminate treatment did not serve a therapeutic
goal. Nor did it serve other important goals including retribu-
tion or incapacitation. Virtually every state in America had
discarded this approach to sex offenders.' e
Only five years before the enactment of the predator com-
mitment law, the Washington legislature repealed the state's
sexual psychopath law.1°1 Yet, within an extremely short time,
the legislature had once again resurrected the medical model
of indeterminate treatment and implemented it in its most
extreme form. This process demonstrates that the legislature
could not have considered the customary bases for law revi-
sion, including a thorough review of empirical knowledge and
a thoughtful analysis of both its costs and effectiveness.
Rather, the legislature, reacting to one vivid case °2 and
responding to the public passion mobilized by victims' rights
groups, 1 3 disingenuously decided to use civil commitment of
the mentally ill as a justifying facade for lifetime preventive
detention.
Additionally, the predator law served to bond the commu-
nity by channeling the public's diffuse instinctual urge for
retaliation, stirred by the story of "the little boy," on to a fixed
100. Norval Morris notes how even Illinois rarely uses its sexual psychopath law.
See Norval Morris, Keynote Address, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517 (1992).
101. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
102. Law reform spawned by tragic crimes is not unusual. Good evidence indicates
that extensive publicity of a high profile crime generates public fear and demands for
law reform. LA FOND & DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM, supra note 32. Indeed,
Washington went through this process before when the legislature revised its
Involuntary Treatment Act in 1979 to make it easier to commit mentally ill individuals
for involuntary treatment after a patient, who was denied voluntary admission to
Western State Hospital, murdered two neighbors. The effect of this law was to
exclude virtually all voluntary patients from Western State Hospital. Mary L.
Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395
(1985) [hereinafter Durham & La Fond, Empirical Consequences].
103. Victims' rights groups made sure their members attended legislative hearings
and were seated in prominent positions, thereby visibly reminding legislators of their
power at the polls. The year 1990, in which the legislature passed the Community
Protection Act, was also an election year.
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target of powerless and hated "outsiders" who could serve as
an outlet for communal anger and revenge.1° 4 Conveniently,
the law also diverted public attention away from politicians'
earlier failures to "solve the crime problem." Many of the
other laws recommended by the Task Force and passed by the
legislature are very sound public policy. One wonders why it
took a tragedy before they were enacted.
The fast-track process of law revision and the uncontrolla-
ble climate of public loathing for sex offenders precluded
thoughtful reflection and deliberation. l 5 Only after the law
was enacted and implemented were some of the significant
problems spawned by the law thoroughly analyzed and dis-
cussed. Not surprisingly, these problems were analyzed in
depth only in the first constitutional challenge to the law. 106
Thus, the stakes that hinge on resolution of these issues are
now enormous.
This haphazard type of law revision process is dangerous.
Legislatures all too often respond to the will of the majority in
the heat of the moment without fully understanding the full
nature of the problem and whether the proposed legal solu-
tions will be effective. Law must operate over time and over
many cases. It should not zig and zag every time a terrible
human tragedy occurs. As important, legislatures need to be
more candid about the limits of law. Not every social problem
can be solved by passing a law. Law revision is particularly ill-
conceived if the law is contrary to sound empirical knowledge
and fundamental values held deeply over time. Enacting a
criminal statute may comfort society by promising a solution,
but in the long run, such an empty promise simply creates
more anger and frustration with the legal system and those
connected with it. And, as Professor Julie Shapiro insightfully
notes,10 7 such legislative action encourages society to place the
causes of sexual violence in the pathological psyches of a small
and unique group of "disordered" offenders. This societal per-
ception allows us to avoid any need to examine ourselves and
104. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS-STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 1-
18 (1963).
105. See Scheingold, supra note 60, at 816-20.
106. See Briefs of Appellants and Amici Curiae, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Washington, and the Washington State Psychiatric Association, In re Young
(Wash. filed Feb. 4, 1991) (No. 57837-1).
107. Julie Shapiro, Sources of Security, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 843 (1992).
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our culture as potentiating such violence.'0 8
If anything, the Shriner case may tell us that the criminal
justice system is already overloaded and is being asked to carry
far too much weight for community safety. Perhaps scarce
resources could have been spent more productively by provid-
ing treatment to Shriner when he was young or, if necessary,
in ensuring convictions for more serious offenses and longer
sentences in his previous prosecution. But the prosecutor's
office was already under tremendous caseload strain at the
time. Perhaps the sentencing judge, too, did not expressly
make clear that Shriner's sentences in his earlier adult convic-
tion were to be served consecutively rather than concurrently
because the judge was being asked to do too much. Simply put,
loading our criminal justice, or civil commitment system if you
prefer, with more and more tasks is a formula for an even
greater systems failure in the future. Effective social control
requires recognizing the limits of the criminal law and making
intelligent choices.
V. THE LAW EXAMINED
At the heart of the predator commitment statute is a sin-
gle question: can the state confine a once-convicted sex
offender who has served his full prison term and who is enti-
tled under the law to his liberty, but who is considered at risk
of committing another sex crime if released? In its most com-
pelling, and distorting, literary form, the question might be
retold like this: would you let Earl Shriner out? As we have
already seen, his is not the only story or the only question that
must be told or answered.
A. The Legislature's Options
The legislature had a number of potential options open to
it. To understand why lawmakers chose the predator commit-
ment law, one must consider these options. As noted earlier,
Washington adopted determinate sentencing in 1984 and
enacted relatively light penalty provisions for sex offenders.'0 9
The legislature could have reduced the risk to the community
from chronic sex offenders with relative ease through the use
of prospective legislation. It could have enacted extended,
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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indeterminate sentences for repeat sex offenders. This
approach, however, would have undermined the philosophy of
determinate sentencing adopted by the state just a few years
earlier. Alternatively, the legislature could have enacted inde-
terminate commitment for treatment of sex offenders in lieu
of punishment. But this would have undermined the recently
adopted just deserts theory of punishment. Lawmakers could
have also enacted lifetime sentences for repeat sex offenders.
Finally, the legislature could have, and did, adopt enhanced
penalties for sex crimes to apply to all criminals convicted of
these crimes after the new legislation became effective.11 °
These penalties were designed to keep future sex offenders,
particularly repeat offenders, in prison for longer periods of
time, thereby preventing those offenders from committing new
crimes while incarcerated.
But what could have been done about convicted sex
offenders considered dangerous who were presently serving
prison terms"' and who were about to reach the end of their
lawful periods of confinement? Could lawmakers promise
their constituents that the law could keep possible future Earl
Shriners in confinement forever?
Several possibilities were available to keep currently incar-
cerated sex offenders off the streets. The legislature could
have extended prison terms for already convicted sex offend-
ers, expanded the general civil commitment statute to include
sex offenders, adopted preventive detention, or created a spe-
cial commitment system for sex offenders. Let us examine
these options in turn.
1. Extending Prison Terms Retroactively for Selected Sex
Offenders
First, the legislature might have simply tried to extend, on
a selective basis, the prison terms of sex offenders presently in
custody who are considered at risk for reoffending. Under this
approach, the state would review the records of sex offenders
currently serving their prison terms and would extend the
period of incarceration for those considered at risk of reoffend-
ing if released. This approach, however, presents a fundamen-
110. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, §§ 701-702 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.94A.310-.320 (Supp. 1990-91)).
111. Many of the prison terms were surprisingly short given the offenders' records
of past convictions.
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tal problem; it is unconstitutional. The constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto punishment clearly precludes
any attempt to extend prison terms.112 Case law indisputably
establishes that the legislature was bound to the determinate
sentencing philosophy it had adopted in 1984 and that no per-
suasive argument could be made to uphold an extension of
maximum sentences for a punitive or protective purpose." 3
2. General Involuntary Civil Commitment
A second option open to the legislature would have been
to use the general civil commitment law to keep presently con-
fined sex offenders under state control. Coercive civil commit-
ment under the state's Involuntary Treatment Act ("ITA")
was an available system of care and control that could have
been used to confine mentally ill individuals who, as a result of
mental disorder, are dangerous to themselves or to others."14
The ITA authorizes the state to seek involuntary hospitaliza-
tion of any individual who suffers from a mental disorder that
causes him to be dangerous or gravely disabled." 5 For several
reasons, however, this law probably would not have assured
the long-term detention of a convicted sex offender who was
about to be, or had been, released from prison.
First, the ITA requires the state to prove that an individ-
ual is mentally ill. As noted earlier, most sex offenders are not
112. The U.S. Constitution prohibits the enactment of penal legislation that: (1)
punishes as a crime an act previously committed that was innocent when done; (2)
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or (3)
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to the law at the
time the act was committed. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37
(1990).
113. Collins, 497 U.S. at 37. Extending prison terms for crimes already committed
and prosecuted is clearly prohibited by the ex post facto clause. See also Addleman v.
Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986) and Foucha v.
Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1807 (1992) (Thomas J. dissenting):
If Foucha had been convicted of the crimes with which he was charged and
sentenced to the statutory maximum of 32 years in prison, the State would
not be entitled to extend his sentence at the end of that period. To do so
would obviously violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws set forth in Art.
I, § 10, cl. 1.
114. See generally John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BuFF. L. REV. 499 (1981) [hereinafter La Fond,
Purposes of Commitment].
115. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989). For a historical overview of this law's
derivation and an explanation of how it is implemented, see Durham & La Fond,
Empirical Consequences, supra note 102.
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mentally ill.11  Indeed, the Task Force Report candidly
acknowledged that the individuals it sought to confine were
not mentally ill.1 17 Second, to show dangerousness, the state
would have to present evidence of "recent, overt acts" by the
individual that caused harm or the reasonable apprehension of
harm to others.1 " In short, the underlying philosophy of the
ITA is to permit short-term intensive hospitalization of men-
tally ill individuals as dangerous only if their recent behavior
establishes that they are dangerous. This philosophy is based
in part on the fact that mental health professionals have no
expertise in making long-term predictions of dangerousness." 9
Long-term commitment is discouraged, both by stringent evi-
dentiary requirements and by automatic short-term judicial
review of commitment.120 Of course, most sex offenders con-
fined in prison or recently released from prison would not
have committed recent, overt acts manifesting their dangerous-
ness.' 21 To their credit, neither the Task Force nor the legisla-
ture wanted to change the ITA's commitment criteria or to
permit longer confinement under that law.
More importantly, the Task Force and the legislature did
not want to use behavioral commitment criteria. The legisla-
ture sought to avoid criteria that looked at how the individual
was actually behaving in the time period just before the gov-
ernment sought his commitment. Both the ITA122  and
Supreme Court cases interpreting that law1 23 clearly required
116. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
117. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
118. See In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982). Moreover, the
law requires that anyone committed as dangerous based solely on threats could not be
confined beyond the initial 14 day period of hospitalization unless the state could prove
he or she actually committed dangerous acts while in confinement. WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 71.05 (1989 & Supp. 1990-91).
119. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
120. The law provides for automatic judicial review of confinement at 14 days, 90
days, and every 180 days thereafter. See Durham & La Fond, Empirical Consequences,
supra note 102, at 404-05.
121. Shriner, of course, was a rare exception; evidence of recent overt acts was
present in his case. Professor Boerner concluded that such evidence would be
necessary before the government could obtain commitment under the predator law.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. His prediction has not proven accurate. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
122. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989 & Supp. 1990-91).
123. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982); In re La Belle, 107 Wash.
2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
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the state to present evidence proving that the individual's
recent behavior justified his civil commitment.
The Task Force wanted a system that was essentially ret-
rospective; it wanted a law that would extend prison terms for
offenders already in prison based on the individual's prior
criminal record. In most cases, the state simply could not pro-
duce the type of recent evidence establishing present danger-
ousness that was required by the ITA and Washington case
law. Thus, most sex offenders could not have been committed
under the ITA unless it was amended and, even if they could
have been committed, the state probably could not have kept
most of them in confinement for long periods of time.
Finally, using the ITA would have presented other serious
problems. Its use would have seriously compounded the
stigma and bias society already associates with the mentally
ill.'24 Also, case law suggested that sexually dangerous individ-
uals could not be commingled in institutions with regular ITA
patients.12  Thus, the legislature chose not to utilize the ITA
to keep sexual offenders confined.
3. Preventative Detention
Preventive confinement of an individual considered dan-
gerous solely to prevent possible future crime was a third pos-
sible strategy the legislature might have used to prevent
recidivism. But this system of social control would probably
have provided only temporary protection. Preventive deten-
tion solely to prevent future crime is constitutionally permissi-
ble under our Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, has
upheld preventive detention schemes only in extraordinary
and extremely rare circumstances and, in most cases, has done
so only to permit temporary control over an individual pending
subsequent legal proceedings, such as a criminal trial or a juve-
nile hearing. 121 Moreover, preventive detention is permissible
124. Organizations concerned with the needs of the mentally ill spoke out against
calling sex offenders "mentally ill" because this inaccurate characterization would
make the public think that the mentally ill were especially dangerous.
125. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
126. The earliest approved uses of preventive detention arose out of the chaos of
war and insurrection. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving
unreviewable executive power to detain enemy aliens in time of war); Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (rejecting due process claim of individual jailed without
probable cause by governor in time of insurrection).
More recently, the Supreme Court has permitted short-term detention of
dangerous individuals pending other judicial proceedings. See County of Riverside v.
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only for a brief period of time and only after the government
has made a substantial showing that serious harm is imminent
and that no other means will prevent the harm from
occurring.
121
The government clearly could not have met the stringent
requirements constitutionally required to preventively detain
sex offenders. First, in most cases prosecutors could not show
imminent harm. 121 Second, detention would not be limited in
duration as Foucha v. Louisiana129 and United States v.
Salerno3 ° require. Third, prosecutors would have difficulty
proving that less restrictive control measures, such as commu-
nity monitoring or registration of sex offenders, would not rea-
sonably safeguard the community.
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court held that Louisiana
could not preventively detain indefinitely a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity who was no longer mentally ill but
was still considered dangerous. Justice White said:
Salerno, unlike this case, involved pretrial detention. We
observed in Salerno that the "government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compel-
ling," and that the statute involved there was a constitu-
tional implementation of that interest. The statute carefully
limited the circumstances under which detention could be
McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) (permitting warrantless arrest and detention of a
person suspected of crime for 48 hours before a magistrate must determine if probable
cause exists); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (permitting arrest and detention of
a person suspected of crime until a neutral magistrate "promptly" determines if
probable cause exists); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). See also Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (finding no absolute constitutional barrier to
detaining potentially dangerous residents pending deportation proceedings).
The Supreme Court has also approved short-term confinement of dangerous
criminal suspects prior to their trial. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
(permitting detention until trial of an arrestee if no release conditions assure
community safety); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (permitting pretrial detention
of an accused juvenile delinquent); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (permitting
detention until trial of a person arrested for a crime if there is a risk of flight or
danger to witnesses).
127. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739, 748-
49.
128. Even Shriner, who had been fantasizing about his crime and displayed his
fantasies in words and drawings, did not commit a crime for two years after his
release. In testifying before the Senate Law and Justice Committee on January 11,
1990, Professor Boerner, the principal drafter of the law, concluded that prosecutors
would be unlikely to obtain commitment without explicit evidence of impending
criminal intent. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
130. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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sought to those involving the most serious crimes (crimes of
violence, offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death,
serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders), and was
narrowly focused on a particularly acute problem in which
the government interestes are overwhelming. In addition to
demonstrating probable cause, the government was required,
in a 'full-blown adversary hearing,' to convince a netural
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no con-
ditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or of any person... Furthermore, the duration
of confinement under the Act was strictly limited. The
arrestee was entitled to a prompt detention hearing and the
maximum length of pretrial detention was limited by the
'stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.' If the
arrestee was convicted, he would be confined as a criminal
proved guilty; if he were acquitted, he would go free.
131
Thus, Foucha clearly establishes that the state may not use
indefinite preventive detention to prevent a dangerous person
from committing a crime.
4. Special Purpose Involuntary Civil Commitment
Clearly, some legal mechanism of control was needed if
the state were to confine indefinitely sex offenders considered
at risk of reoffending past the expiration date of their prison
terms. But the options of extending prison terms or using pre-
ventive detention would surely be struck down as unconstitu-
tional and relying on the general civil commitment law for the
mentally ill would not be effective.
Then the Deus Ex Machina appeared. Only one system of
social control authorizes lifetime confinement to prevent possi-
ble future harm: involuntary civil commitment of the men-
tally disabled. 132  The legislature might be able to keep
convicted sex offenders in confinement even after they had
served their full prison terms. To do this the legislature would
have to harness the awesome power of the medical model that
authorizes indefinite commitment of the mentally ill for treat-
ment and apply it to a speciously fabricated class of "mentally
abnormal" sex offenders. It chose to do just that.
131. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786 (citations omitted).
132. See generally La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 114;
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190 (1974).
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B. Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators
As noted earlier, involuntary civil commitment of the
mentally ill rests on the assumption that individuals suffer
from a mental illness that makes them dangerous to them-
selves or to others and that those individuals are in need of
care and control. The legislature, acting on the recommenda-
tion of the Task Force, decided to characterize a class of sex
offenders as mentally abnormal, dangerous, and in need of con-
trol and treatment.
An examination of the Task Force Report and the stat-
ute's language reveals that the legislature did not really
believe sex offenders were mentally disordered and in need of
treatment. Moreover, neither the statute's purpose or effect is
to provide treatment for the mentally ill as required by the
United States Supreme Court.133 Thus, this law simply cannot
be justified as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power
or parens patriae power' 34 because it does not meet the funda-
mental constitutional requirement recently enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court: "[T]he purpose of commitment
following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment,
is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and
society from his potential dangerousness."135 Likewise, the
California Supreme Court said: "Not only is medical treatment
the raison d'etre of the [California] mentally disordered sex
offender law, it is its sole constitutional justification." '136
The Washington statute does not apply to a group of indi-
viduals who are mentally ill in any medically recognized sense
as the Washington State Psychiatric Association demonstrated
in its amicus curiae brief.'37 The law applies to those who suf-
fer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder."
"Mental abnormality" has no clinical or diagnostic meaning
within medically recognized systems of nomenclature or diag-
nosis. 3' Indeed, the phrase can mean almost anything includ-
133. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
134. For a general discussion of these bases of state authority, see La Fond,
Purposes of Commitment, supra note 114.
135. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (emphasis added).
136. People v. Feagley, 535 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1975).
137. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n at 3, In re
Young (Wash. filed Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter State Psychiatric Ass'n
Brief].
138. "Mental Abnormality" is not used in the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
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ing unexpected, not average, not typical, or whatever other
meaning an observer chooses to infuse into these words. "Per-
sonality disorder" has a clinically recognized meaning; how-
ever, its core meaning is essentially tautological. "Antisocial
behavior" is most often used to define this diagnostic category.
Such behavior can include inability to sustain consistent work,
unlawful conduct, irritability, aggressiveness, not honoring
financial obligations, impulsiveness, and lying.'39 Simply put, a
personality disorder "is but a shorthand way of describing a
pattern of maladaptive behavior."' 4 ° Moreover, no personality
disorder is specific to sex offenders in the psychiatric system of
disease and mental disorder.
1 4 1
Only six years before the enactment of the predator com-
mitment statute, the Washington State Legislature prospec-
tively abolished an involuntary treatment scheme for sex
offenders because it did not believe such offenders were men-
tally ill and could be treated involuntarily. The Task Force
also reached this conclusion. It wrote: "Under current laws,
sexually violent predators only qualify for civil detention when
a mental illness or mental disorder is present. The Task Force
examined the histories of some individual violent predators
who had been judged not to have a mental illness or mental
disorder and therefore were not detainable."'2
Foucha v. Louisiana,143 a recent Supreme Court case, con-
firms this analysis and establishes that confinement under the
statute cannot be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
state's civil commitment authority.'" Justice White's majority
opinion affirmed the holding of Jones145 that: "The State may
also confine a mentally ill person if it shows 'by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and
dangerous.' "146
ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS DSM-III-
R, which is the basic system of mental disorder classification. See generally DSM-III-
R, supra note 53.
139. See DSM-III-R, supra note 53, at 345-46.
140. See State Psychiatric Ass'n Brief, supra note 137, at 8.
141. DSM-III-R, supra note 53.
142. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 11-21 (emphasis added).
143. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
144. For a more thorough analysis of the application of Foucha to the Washington
statute see Supplemental Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington,
In re Young (Wash. filed June 10, 1992) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter ACLU
Supplemental Brief].
145. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
146. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 362) (emphasis added).
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The majority opinion concluded, however, that a citizen
could not be considered "mentally ill" because he suffered
from an antisocial personality or personality disorder that pur-
portedly made him dangerous to himself or others. Such a sys-
tem of confinement would, in effect, be based solely on
perceived dangerousness and would lead to an Orwellian world
of "dangerousness courts," a technique of social control funda-
mentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
ordered liberty. In Foucha, Justice White warned states not to
abuse the medical model of involuntary civil commitment for
social control purposes:
Here, in contrast, the State asserts that because Foucha
once committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial
personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a dis-
order for which there is no effective treatment, he may be
held indefinitely. This rationale would permit the State to
hold indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally
ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder that
may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of
any convicted criminal, even though he has completed his
prison term. It would also be only a step away from substi-
tuting confinements for dangerousness for our present sys-
tem which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from
permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates
only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
violated a criminal law.
147
With uncanny clairvoyance, Justice White exactly
described the Washington statute which authorizes the govern-
ment to do precisely what Foucha expressly says the govern-
ment may not do: confine someone indefinitely as dangerous
who was not mentally ill but simply had a personality disorder
or an antisocial personality.
48
The words of the statute establish this fundamental prem-
ise beyond question. In enacting the law, the legislature said:
147. Id. at 1787 (emphasis added).
148. According to Foucha, the state may not commit such an individual even if the
antisocial personality "sometimes leads to aggressive conduct." Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at
1787. It should be noted that Foucha, unlike most individuals who are subject to
incarceration under the Washington statute, had been found legally insane; i.e., to have
suffered from a mental illness which was causally related to his criminal behavior. If a
"personality disorder" or "anti-social personality" is constitutionally insufficient to
civilly commit someone like Foucha, a fortiori, it is constitutionally insufficient to
civilly commit individuals who have never been found to suffer from mental illness
which was causally related to their criminal behavior.
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The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous
group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a
mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
the existing involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW,
which is intended to be a short-term civil commitment sys-
tem that is primarily designed to provide short-term treat-
ment to individuals with serious mental disorders and then
return them to the community. In contrast to persons
appropriate for civil commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW,
sexually violent predators generally have anti-social person-
ality features which are unamenable to existing mental ill-
ness treatment modalities and those features render them
likely to engage in sexually violent behavior...149
The statute expressly creates a special class of persons who are
not mentally ill and whose past criminal conduct was not
caused by mental illness."5 Rather, it authorizes lifetime com-
mitment of individuals who suffer from "anti-social per-
sonalilty features"1 5 ' which allegedly render them likely to
reoffend. Foucha establishes that such a system is not a valid
use of the medical model of civil commitment.
Even the dissenting opinions in Foucha agreed that civil
commitment requires a finding of both mental illness and dan-
gerousness and that neither "anitsocial personality" or "per-
sonality disorder" constitute "mental illness."' 2 Both Justice
Kennedy and Justice Thomas would uphold the continuing
confinement of Foucha based on a showing of dangerousness
alone solely because it should be considered a criminal com-
mitment rather than a civil commitment. 1 53 Justice Kennedy
said:
The majority's failure to recognize the criminal character of
these proceedings and its concomitant standards of proof
leads it to conflate the standards for civil and criminal com-
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91) (emphasis added).
150. See Bodine, supra note 8, at 129.
151. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
152. See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1794-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) and at 1801, 1808-09
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Justice Kennedy characterized Foucha's commitment as criminal rather than
civil becuase the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
a crime and the defendant, in turn, successfully established the affirmative defense of
insanity; i.e. that at the time of the offense, as a result of mental illness, he did not
know what he was doing or that it was wrong. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1791-93 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The state characterized the statute as an exercise of its civil
commitment authority. See Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant State of
Washington at 17-21, In re Young (Wash. filed Oct. 30, 1991) (No. 57836-1).
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mitment in a manner not permitted by our precedents.
O'Connor v. Donaldson and Addington v. Texas, define the
due process limits of involuntary civil commitment.
Together they stand for the proposition that in civil proceed-
ings the Due Process Clause requires the State to prove both
insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Their precedential value in the civil context is
beyond question. But it is an error to apply these prece-
dents, as the majority does today, to criminal proceedings."
Justice Thomas in dissent also agrees with Justice Kennedy on
this crucial point:
There are, we recognized, 'important differences between
the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and the
class of insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of
proof.' In sharp contrast to a civil committee, an insanity
acquittee is institutionalized only where 'the acquittee him-
self advances insanity as a defense and proves that his crim-
inal act was a product of his mental illness' and thus 'there
is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of
error.
' 155
In sum, Foucha establishes that the statute is not a consti-
tutionally permissible assertion of the state's power of civil
commitment because it doe not confine for treatment and con-
trol only those individuals who suffer from a mental illness
and, as a result of such illness, are dangerous. Rather, specula-
tion about "personality features" or types, together with con-
clusory allegations of dangerousness some time in the future,
qualify a citizen under the statute for indefinite incarceration
in a psychiatric prison. This is precisely the system of "con-
finements for dangerousness" explicitly forbidden by Foucha.
Moreover, any dispassionate analysis of the statutory
scheme leads to the inevitable conclusion that the purpose of
the law is not to provide treatment. Any rational treatment
scheme would require involuntary treatment for the mentally
ill soon after the alleged mental illness had first manifested
itself in deviant behavior. The statute does not do this.
Rather, it waits until the person is about to walk or has
already walked out of the prison gates before it recognizes the
154. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 367 (1983)) (emphasis added).
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miraculous onset of mental disorder and the sudden need for
treatment.
Additionally, as noted earlier, no solid and convincing evi-
dence even suggests that involuntary treatment is effective in
treating sex offenders or in reducing recidivism." The Task
Force and the legislature candidly acknowledged this central
fact. 57 Even more disturbing is the so-called treatment now
being provided for individuals committed under the predator
commitment law. Each inmate is provided with about four
hours of "group therapy" each week by staff members who
have minimal educational and professional credentials and
have no formal training in sex offender therapy." s A report
by Dr. Vernon L. Quinsey on the treatment provided at the
Special Commitment Center, where individuals committed
under the law are confined, is extremely pessimistic about the
treatment efficacy of the program.1
9
Michael Moore has spoken eloquently of the insidious
impact the rhetoric of treatment may have on social practices
of punishment. It is all too relevant here.
[The] recasting of punishment in terms of "treatment" for
the good of the criminal makes possible a kind of moral
blindness that is dangerous in itself. As C. S. Lewis pointed
out some years ago, adopting a "humanitarian" conceptual-
ization of punishment makes it easy to inflict treatments and
sentences that need bear no relation to the desert of the
offender. We may do more to others "for their own good"
than we ever allow ourselves to do when we see that it is
really for our own good that we act.16°
A candid statement by the legislature that preventive
detention was the statute's purpose would surely have assured
its constitutional demise in the courts. Honesty would have
obstructed instrumental goals. Thus, creative characterization,
such as "mental abnormality" and "treatment," and deliber-
ately pejorative terms, such as "sexually violent predator,"
156. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
158. Telephone interview with Jennifer Shaw, attorney for several inmates
committed under this law (April 8, 1992).
159. See Vernon L. Quinsey, Review of the Washington State Special Commitment
Center Program for Sexually Violent Predators (Feb. 1992) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author). For excerpts from Quinsey's Review, see infra Appendix I.
160. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
235 (1984).
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were necessary to mask its real purpose and, hopefully, to
insulate the statute from judicial scrutiny. In short, the legis-
lature deliberately misused the medical model of therapy
solely to achieve lifetime preventive detention.
C. Legal Rhetoric and Violence
The Task Force and the legislature deliberately employed
incendiary language designed to ignite public anger and fear by
using the phrase "sexually violent predator" in the statute. As
already discussed, this key definitional term has no clinical or
medical meaning. Additionally, the empirical literature on sex
offenders fails to establish that such a type of sex offender
exists, let alone that treatment is available to help them.
Rather, legislators sought to evoke a loathsome and frightful
zeitgeist that reinforced the public's fear that legions of sex
offenders are at large who spend most of their time stalking
their victims and committing heinous sexual crimes of
violence.
161
Robert Cover has poignantly pointed out that pejorative
rhetoric in the law enables prosecutors, judges, and juries to
justify more readily the terrible violence they inflict on fellow
human beings.16 2 The rhetoric used in the Washington statute
is even more insidious. Persons committed under this law have
been fully punished for their past crimes and, having paid their
debt to society, are entitled under our constitutional system to
their liberty. They have done nothing more to deserve indefi-
nite psychiatric incarceration. And as I shall note later, they
can do nothing to avoid incarceration under this law. A scarlet
letter has been emblazoned on them for life, continually rend-
ing them candidates for lifetime imprisonment.
D. Constitutional Solutions
Legitimate and constitutionally acceptable methods exist
for dealing with the danger posed by violent sex offenders.
These include: (1) indeterminate sentencing; 6 3 (2) recidivist
sentencing statutes that permit extended incarceration, includ-
161. Interestingly, many of the crimes which qualify an individual for
commitment are not violent in the usual meaning of that word. For example,
statutory rape in the second degree and indecent liberties against a child under age
fourteen are qualifying crimes. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1990-91).
162. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); The
Supreme Court 1982 Term, Forward Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
163. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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ing lifetime imprisonment, for repeat sex offenders;"8 and (3)
bona fide commitment for control and treatment as an alterna-
tive to punishment.
16 5
Often legislative choices on public policy have constitu-
tional consequences. In 1984, the Washington State Legislature
chose to abolish prospectively the sexual psychopath pro-
gram16 and to adopt a determinate sentencing scheme that
provided unconscionably short prison terms for serious repeat
sex offenders.167 Our constitutional system requires society to
abide by the social compact embodied in the criminal law and
to punish in accordance with that law. The new statute is a
disingenuous attempt to preserve determinate sentencing
while at the same time extending the prison terms for a few
convicted sex offenders selected on an arbitrary and random
basis. 166
VI. THE REAL HARMS CAUSED BY THE STATUTE
Much more is at stake in this controversy than whether
the state can confine indefinitely a few unlucky individuals in
a psychiatric prison to appease public outrage over a heinous
sex crime. If that were the only harm done by this law, those
who care about our constitutional system of punishment and
individual rights might be tempted to look the other way.
Unfortunately, however, this law may cause much more seri-
ous harm.
A. The Teflon Slippery Slope
If upheld, this law will essentially permit a legislature to
use lifetime preventive detention on any group of offenders
who have served their prison terms and have been, or will be,
released. All that is required to accomplish such a goal is a
statute that labels criminals who have committed a single
crime as suffering from a "mental abnormality" that makes
them "likely to reoffend" and authorizes their lifetime confine-
ment for "treatment." Simply put, the predator commitment
164. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
165. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1984).
166. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws
ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).
167. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137 (codified at scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE)
(law became effective in 1984).
168. See also Scheingold et al., supra note 60 at 809-11.
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law has detached involuntary commitment from the medical
model of mental illness and bona fide treatment.
Once detached, literally no stopping point exists. The logic
of the predator commitment law can be applied to people who
drive while under the influence of alcohol, who assault their
domestic partners or children, who use crack cocaine, or who
commit whatever the new "crime-of-the-month" happens to
be. Indeed, if mental abnormality, future recidivism, and the
need for treatment can be deduced by the commission of a sin-
gle past crime, the legislature is totally free to create what Jus-
tice Stevens aptly called a "shadow... criminal code."1"9 Such
a code can be invoked, not only as an alternative to crime and
punishment, but as a way of extending punishment
indefinitely.
Professor Jim Ellis raises the disturbing possibility that
society might create "dangerousness courts" in which citizens
are judged to be "dangerous" and in need of confinement even
though they do not suffer from any form of mental illness or
disability. 70 Indeed, no logical reason explains why even a sin-
gle conviction is needed to commit a person as dangerous.
Could gang members, perhaps selected on the basis of gender,
age, and race be committed as dangerous?
Prophetically, James Boyd White has argued eloquently
that misuses of the involuntary treatment model, like Wash-
ington's, are immoral:
... [Under] a compulsory treatment system operated on the
model of our present involuntary commitment practices, ...
[t]he basis for detention would be a judgment not about the
blameworthiness of one's conduct but about the propensities
of one's personality.... We would all be subject to compul-
sory detention when the interests of the public were judged
to required it. This is unthinkable. It would expose every
169. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 380, 384 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
. . nothing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of
"dangerous person" statutes to shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate
commitment would derive from proven violations of criminal statutes,
combined with findings of mental disorders and "criminal propensities," and
constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply
inapplicable. The goal would be "treatment"; the result would be evisceration
of criminal law and its accompanying protections.
Id.
170. James Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine "Dangerous" Persons:
Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 635
(1992).
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citizen to the incompetence, caprice, and corruption of coer-
cive official action ... [and] would define every citizen not as
a free person with defined liberties, but as simply belonging
to the bureaucratic state for its use. It would also abolish
distinctions that are natural and important to us: the dis-
tinction, for example . . . between dangerous people who
never act on their propensities and those who do .... 171
B. The Law Is Counterproductive
Professors David Wexler and Bruce Winick have devel-
oped a powerful analytic perspective called "therapeutic juris-
prudence" for use in evaluating mental health legislation. 2 In
their view legal rules are social forces that can themselves pro-
duce therapeutic or anit-therapeutic consequences. Thus,
policymakers should carefully consider sound social science
evidence in determining whether a particular law has had a
desirable or undesirable impact. The predator law has had a
profound and emphatic anti-therapeutic impact.
As noted earlier, Washington provides treatment for many
sex offenders on a voluntary basis while they serve their
prison terms.173 Offenders now in this treatment program
have been notified that anything they say to their therapists
may be used to commit them under the predator commitment
law.174 Because of this risk, many offenders may fail to partici-
pate in this treatment program or may fail to be fully candid
with their therapists. The chilling effect of this new law risks
destruction of the only real therapeutic program being offered
to incarcerated sex offenders in our state. In the future, many
offenders may be released from prison who did not receive the
appropriate counseling and treatment they would otherwise
have received. Some of them may commit crimes after they
are released. Sadly, the predator commitment law may make
Washington state a more dangerous place.
171. WHITE, supra note 11, at 207.
172. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1990); DAIvD B. WEXLER &
BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
173. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
174. See Memorandum from Janet Barbour, Superintendent, Twin Rivers
Corrections Center, to Inmates Participating in SOTP (Oct. 17, 1990) (copy on file with
the University of Puget Sound Law Review) (notifying inmates in the sex offender
treatment program that the Department of Corrections will, under appropriate
circumstances, turn over their treatment files to prosecutors for possible use in
predator commitment proceedings).
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C The Law Misuses Scarce Resources
At most, thirty-six beds are presently available in the facil-
ity to commit sexual predators. The facility was constructed
and staffed at a cost of over one million dollars. Implementing
the law will surely cost more than that each year if the full
costs of maintaining and staffing the facility, as well as of con-
ducting trials and appeals under the law, are taken into
account. This money might have been better spent on other
programs that have proven to be more effective in helping vic-
tims and preventing future sex crimes. Such efficacious pro-
grams include treatment for juvenile offenders, additional
assistance to victims, and more prosecutors and prison cells.
Already, some of these programs have been cut in these tight
fiscal times.
1 75
As a result of the past legislative session, the number of
authorized beds at the Sex Offender Treatment Program at
Twin Rivers has been reduced from 370 to somewhere between
170 and 200. Thus, a significant loss of up to 200 beds has been
imposed on a treatment program that is considered very effec-
tive. Some treatment staff have been let go while others have
found government employment elsewhere. This loss of
resources means that, over a number of years, hundreds of
convicted sex offenders will receive no treatment or will
receive only truncated treatment while they serve their prison
terms.176 Surely, such a result is not a wise use of scarce
resources.
Moreover, the law cannot even hope to successfully pre-
vent future crimes if the predator commitment system does
not accurately select and incarcerate those individuals who
would reoffend if not committed. Undoubtedly, mental health
professionals are extremely poor predictors of dangerous
behavior. At best, they accurately predict dangerousness in
only two out of five cases.177 Professor Boerner reports that
175. In light of recent budget cuts, officials decided in November 1991 not to fill
eleven positions to treat juvenile sex offenders. Hal Spencer, State Cuts Hit Safety,
Welfare of Poor, JOURNAL AMERICAN (Bellevue), Nov. 27, 1991, at A-7.
176. Telephone interview with Barbara Schwartz, Director, Sex Offender
Treatment Program, Director, Sex Offender Treatment Program, Twin Rivers
Corrections Center (Apr. 16, 1992).
177. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981);
Robert J. Menzies et al., Hitting the Forensic Sound Barrier: Predictions of
Dangerousness in a Pretrial Psychiatric Clinic, in DANGEROUSNESS: PROBABILITY AND
PREDICTION, PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLICY 115-44 (1985).
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many studies indicate that predictions of dangerousness can be
wrong eighty to ninety percent of the time.17s Simply put,
large numbers of sex offenders will have to be warehoused at
great cost in order to have even a modest impact on reducing
sex offenses.
VII. CONCLUSION
Why, then, has a law which is unconstitutional, expensive,
ineffective, and counterproductive generated such passionate
support? The probable answer is that it has acquired symbolic
significance beyond its operational impact. In short, it has
become a symbol of political power, crime prevention, and
revenge.179 In enacting this law, victims' rights groups have
demonstrated their power to demand and obtain from the
political process any crime control measure they want. The
community has also signalled that it is willing to take
whatever measures it believes necessary to prevent another
story of "the little boy" from ever being told. In supporting
such legislation, politicians can signify their responsiveness for
constituents' concerns and insulate themselves from political
attack. No politician wants to face a sixty-second political
attack on television by his campaign opponent claiming "he
voted against community safety and in favor of sexually violent
predators."
Although the emotional support for the law is understand-
able as a matter of individual and group psychology, under our
constitutional system, the power of the majority also has its
limits. Once we tell singular stories to create generalized
actors and actions and shamelessly exploit the power of narra-
tive to construct a legal order based on inaccurate empirical
knowledge, heedless of constitutional constraints and based on
inaccurate empirical knowledge, we are at serious risk of losing
the special vision of justice that is especially ours. In America,
178. Professor Boerner wrote:
All available evidence indicates that our ability to predict the occurrence of
future criminal behavior is appallingly poor. When attempts are made to
predict future violent crime, the subject of most concern, the results are
worse. The best predictive techniques are accurate in no more than one-third
of the cases and many studies have been wrong eighty to ninety percent of the
time.
BOERNER, supra note 41, at 2-17.
179. See generally Joseph Gussfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process
of Designating Deviancy, 565 CAL. L. REV. 54, 58-59 (1968).
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we punish a citizen for what he has done and not for what we
think he may do.
Perhaps with the passage of time and the cooling of public
passion, we will rediscover our first principles and our funda-
mental values. Perhaps too, we will even realize that we pos-
sess effective ways to safeguard our communities that do not
make them even more dangerous.
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APPENDIX I
[The following is an excerpt from Vernon L. Quinsey's
unpublished manuscript, "Review of the Washington State
Special Commitment Center Program for Sexually Violent
Predators," dated February 1992.]
This review is based upon interviews with most of the pro-
fessional staff associated with the Sexually Violent Predator
Program, community-based clinicians who have served as con-
sultant to the program, and three of the program "residents."
In addition, I have examined the Sexually Violent Predator
Commitment Statute (chapter 71.09, Revised Code of Washing-
ton) and written documentation concerning the Special Com-
mitment Center.
Because the Sexually Violent Predator Program is very
new, this review is primarily intended to facilitate future pro-
gram development and to identify areas of concern.
There are both positive and negative aspects of the Sexu-
ally Violent Predator Program. On the positive side, the treat-
ment staff appeared dedicated to their jobs and enthusiastic in
their endorsement of the purpose of the sexually violent
predator legislation; they are clearly eager to implement treat-
ment programming, ever under exceptionally adverse circum-
stances. The staff are attempting to develop a state of the art
cognitive-behavioral intervention and have had both the oppor-
tunity and resources to receive education and training from a
variety of knowledgeable local resources and more distant
resources (the Sexual Offender Treatment Program at Atas-
cadero State Hospital). These training efforts are important
and should be continued as the staff are, in general, not very
experienced with the population.
It is, of course, impossible at present to appraise the Sexu-
ally Violent Predator Treatment Program both because it is at
a very early stage of development and because there are at
most only three residents who are actively engaged in
treatment.
It is already apparent, however, that there are at least two
very serious difficulties with the program as it stands. The
first pertains to the Sexually Violent Predator Legislation
itself and the second involves resident management and the
manner in which the legislation has been implemented.
[Vol. 15:655
1992] Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law
Sexually Violent Predator Legislation
Great uncertainty in engendered by the ambiguous consti-
tutional status of the current commitment law. Many resi-
dents are simply waiting to see if the law will be declared to be
constitutional. In a sense, everything is on hold until the legal
issues are addressed more definitively.
Many jurisdictions have had experience with a variety of
sexual psychopath or dangerous offender statutes. I have
appended an example of the Canadian Dangerous Offender
Legislation as an example of an alternative approach. How-
ever, most of these indeterminate sentencing laws are invoked
at the initial trial stage instead of at the end of sentence or
even after sentence expiry [sic], as in the present case. I take it
as a given that a front end disposition is better for a variety of
legal, ethical, and therapeutic reasons. The Sexually Violent
Predator Legislation appears to be an interim attempt to rem-
edy past lax initial sentencing and to provide interventions for
those (presumably rare) offenders who may have become more
dangerous during their sentence.
A large literature attests to the difficulty in implementing
indeterminate sentencing laws effectively and fairly: There
have been problems of geographical disparities in their applica-
tion, differential application to the poor, inappropriate applica-
tion (i.e., to nondangerous offenders), and lack of effective
treatment for persons so sentenced. The special commitment
statutes will have to overcome these difficulties as well as
those arising from its back end application.
The nature of the Sexually Violent Predator Legislation is
in itself not conducive to inspiring motivation for treatment
among residents. Residents perceive the law to be arbitrary
and excessive. This perception certainly appears justifiable in
cases where residents have actually been on the street and
have been recommitted without parole violation and/or have
sought treatment while serving their regular sentence and
been denied it for a variety of bureaucratic reasons (e.g., length
of sentence). It is, of course, extremely difficult to form a ther-
apeutic alliance with an embittered clientele.
This lack of motivation means that many residents will
not engage in treatment; many spend most of their time in
their rooms, pursuing litigation about a variety of issues. Quite
clearly, many residents think that the only way they can
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secure their release or at least, quick release, is through
litigation.
Until some residents actually secure their release as a
result of treatment induced changes, it will be extremely diffi-
cult to convince residents that a therapeutic release route is
feasible.
The language of the commitment legislation does not
induce therapeutic optimism. On the one hand, the preamble
to the Special Commitment Statute asserts that persons who
meet the sexual violent predator criteria require long-term
treatment but are unlikely to be "cured," and, on the other,
predicates release on a jury or court finding that the commit-
ted person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has
changed such that the person is safe to be at large and, if
released, will not engage in acts of sexual violence. It is, unfor-
tunately, entirely unclear how a personality disorder can be
changed through treatment because most of the defining fea-
tures of personality disorder diagnoses (such as in DSM-III-R)
are historical in nature.
However, it is possible to conclude that a resident's risk of
committing a further act of sexual violence had been reduced,
regardless of any change in mental abnormality or personality
disorder. Such a conclusion, however, would best be arrived at
in small steps from observations or progress in treatment and
success under gradually reduced supervision. The present pro-
gram has no provision for graduated release or post-release
supervision; instead, decisions are to be made by a court on an
all-or-none basis using information gained entirely from a high
security (and very artificial) environment.
In my view, the lack of any provision for aftercare and
community supervision is a fatal problem with the special com-
mitment program as it stands now. It means that release deci-
sions must be based solely on institutional behavior and that a
relapse prevention approach to treatment cannot be effectively
implemented. The inability to use measures of risk based on
community behaviors to adjust the degree of supervision has to
be rectified if treatment is to be effective and release decisions
accurate.
In developing policies concerning the release of persons
from the Sexually Violent Predator Program, it would be
extremely helpful to be able to accurately estimate the numer-
ical probability of their reoffending. Such actuarial estimates
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of risk are extremely important in assessing the degree to
which risk might be reduced through treatment or managed
through supervision. These measures would be most precise if
they were to be developed through follow-up research on sex
offenders who have been released to the community in the
State of Washington and could build on work done in other
jurisdictions. Given such research, it would be possible to
assess the level of risk presented by offenders with particular
histories and personal characteristics under particular condi-
tions of supervision. I have provided some discussion of these
issues in the Appendix, together with a list of research articles
by my colleagues and myself on the prediction of sexual and
violent recidivism among offenders held under indeterminate
conditions.
Resident Management
One quite worrisome observation made by both staff and
residents was that a number of residents had accrued discipli-
nary infractions in the DSHS program who had never had dis-
ciplinary infractions while in DOC. This is likely to be a result
of several factors: Resident bitterness concerning the indeter-
minate nature of their confinement and its imposition at the
end of their sentence; excessive physical security and rule
related security within the DSHS program; and inconsistent
application of disciplinary rules, particularly across shifts. ...
It was unclear to me why the internal and external level
of security was as high as it was. This is the more worrisome
because gradual reduction in security that would extend to
community... supervision.
It was also unclear why offenders who are awaiting trial
on the issue of their meeting the sexually violent predator cri-
teria are mixed with residents who are in the Sexually Violent
Predator Program for treatment. These trials are extremely
aversive and stressful experiences for these men who, natu-
rally, argue that they do not meet the criteria. One can imag-
ine that, following commitment, these residents would be
expected to recant their defense (admit to being sexually devi-
ant and predatory) to the same staff who just had them com-
mitted. It is, therefore, good that there are separate evaluation
and treatment staff teams. These functions should be kept as
separate as possible. This separation of the staff functions,
however, does not address the issue of missing the pre- and
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post-trial offenders. It would be a small miracle if the anxiety,
anger, and denial of pre-trial assessment cases did not corrupt
whatever treatment motivation the post-trial residents have.
Pre-trial and post-trial cases should be kept physically or, at
least, programmatically separate.
Considerable thought must be given to the management of
those residents who do not make sufficient progress to be
released to the community. It is unrealistic to suppose that
those residents will or should be engaged in full-time sex
offender treatment programming for more than two or three
years. Similarly, some residents will simply not opt to enter
treatment. Many of these cases will likely not require high
levels of internal security. Suitable long-term living arrange-
ments for these men are required that afford appropriate
opportunities for personal development (e.g., community col-
lege courses, trades training, recreation) under the least
restrictive conditions. These conditions are those that best
strike a balance between freedom of the resident and commu-
nity safety. For most of these men, it is likely that secure
perimeter security can be combined with considerable freedom
within the institution.
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